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Christianity Views Fetal Research 
James J. Quinn, S.J. 
Father Quinn is an associate professor of philosophy at the 
Creighton University School of Medicine in Omaha. He teaches theol-
ogy and philosophy. 
It is no longer an easy matter for Christians to have unified solu-
tions to moral problems created by medical science. Disunity is caused 
sometimes by the lack of data surrounding a new medical procedure, 
but most of the time disagreement comes from the vast resources of 
Christian revelation which offer numerous approaches to the solution 
of moral problems. In our present day, the science of theology is 
advancing rapidly, and is responsible for exposing a diversity of start-
ing points or approaches to solving moral problems. 
This article explores four different opinions in one specific area of 
Christian disunity - nontherapeutic (clinical) fetal research. (Nonther-
apeutic research is used to bring benefits to future generations and not 
directly to the volunteer.) In giving moral opinions about the use of 
fetuses in this type of research, Christians have offered more than 
four. But as a background for proposing another view, the four selec-
ted for analysis are sufficient. Professors Fletcher's and Ramsey's 
proposals must be considered first because they present opposing con-
clusions which set the polar limits of Christian disunity. 
Prof. Joseph Fletcher, teacher of medical ethics at the Univer-
sity of Virginia School of Medicine, maintains that any legitimate 
research on a fetus to be aborted is justified because it has no rights 
and belongs to no one. 1 Prof. Paul Ramsey of Princeton University 
has charted a way exactly opposite. He claims that to make any non-
therapeutic research just, consent must be obtained. He finds that no 
one can justly assume the role of proxy, and that the fetus is unable to 
give consent. Hence, fetal research is unjust. 2 
Lying somewhere in between these contraries are other answers. 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Leroy Walters, both associated with 
Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bio-
ethics at Georgetown University, veered toward center when they 
expressed their Catholic views in a recent article: 
"In our opinion, nontherapeutic research that entails 'no discernible risk' or 
'minimal risks ' is morally permissible in the case of children. This view is based 
on the general notion that all members of a society owe certain minimal debts 
to that society, among them the duty to take part in relatively safe biomedical 
research projects . .. this position can without difficulty be applied to fetuses 
whose parents intend to bear responsibility for the case of children·to-be-born." 
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Here, both are talking about fetuses which are to be born. But to give 
guidance to those who believe in a mother's right to have an abortion, 
they offer this principle to protect the fetus to-be-aborted during 
research: 
"In cases involving abortion ... only research procedures which would be per· 
mitted by future parents should be allowed."3 
Recently another "in-between" opinion, which is not Christian in 
origin, but which some Christians adopt appeared in the Federal 
Register. 4 It is very similar to the one above in content, but it is 
bound to have a much greater impact on future fetal research. It was 
drawn up by "The National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research," which submitted a 
number of recommendations and guidelines to Caspar W. Weinberger, 
former secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare .5 He appointed this commission last year to study the public 
policies concerning research on fetuses, pregnant women, and in vitro 
fertilization. The Commission's draft indicated which fetal research 
projects were acceptable and which were not. The Secretary accepted 
the draft July 29, 1975, and made most of it regulatory for all DHEW 
grants, August 8,1975. 
Surprise After Shock 
It is a pleasant surprise to read them. After the terrible shock we 
received when the Supreme Court informed us, January 22, 1973, that 
our forefathers who wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights gave 
no rights to non-viable fetuses, it is surprising to see a government 
body show some concern for them. It is also pleasant -like breathing 
fresh air after working all day in urban smog - to see the sensitivity 
with which fetal life is protected. 
In the formation of the majority of regulations, the Commission 
used four humane principles which did much to retain the traditional 
dignity of incipient life: 1) no research should expose the fetus to any 
risks of life or health unless they are minimal; 2) the fetus should not 
be deprived of the right to give consent, which can be done by proxy 
through the mother; 3) it is prohibitive to do fetal experimentation if 
the knowledge can be obtained other ways, such as through "investi-
gation on pertinent animal models and non-pregnant humans (when 
appropriate);" and 4) all fetuses are to be treated equally without 
discrimination. From these principles, a number of recommendations 
were formed which gave status and protection to the fetus. 
For instance, in their concern for fetal human life no money for 
research would be granted unless the form, to which the mother must 
consent, had proper monitoring and the project passed the scrutiny of 
a review board. Also, when the Commission considered "non thera-
peutic research directed toward the fetus during the abortion pro-
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cedure and nontherapeutic research directed towards the non-viable 
fetus ex utero," it required that the fetus must have gestated less than 
20 weeks, and nothing must be done which would alter the duration 
of the life of the fetus. 
So far, four different views have been presented: Fletcher's, Ram-
sey's, the Commission's, and McCormick's and Walter's. If anyone is 
interested in studying a fuller spectrum of Christian opinions, he may 
wish to examine the summary reports which the Commission noted in 
its minutes during a period when it invited thirty-five witnesses to 
testify - philosophers, theologians, social workers, physicians, organi-
zation spokesmen, lawyers, public officials, and students, (many of 
them speaking from a Christian background).6 The majority agreed 
substantially with at least one of the four opinions already discussed, 
but they did have a number of minor differences. The minutes indicate 
that the Commission depended a great deal upon these testimonies in 
the final draft of their recommendations. 7 
In the process of approaching a unified Christian stand on what is 
right and what is wrong in clinical fetal research, many divergent views 
must be eliminated by showing that even though they may be Chris-
tian in some aspects, they are not representative of Christian teaching 
in all aspects. To some extent the four opinions explained above can 
be eliminated because each one has omitted some part of Christian 
revelation. This last statement will be clarified in the following com-
ments about each one's argument. 
Many Christian philosophers and theologians accept Fletcher's 
observation that what characterizes a "person" is his awareness of 
social and legal rights and responsibilities. They part company with 
him, however, when he insists that rights are consequential to this 
awareness. Fletcher believes that personhood comes into existence 
some years after birth and can depart long before a person dies; only 
during this time do rights exist. To put it another way, only when the 
human being can respond in a meaningful way is he a person; thus, 
fetuses, young children, the senile, and those in irreversible coma have 
no rights. That such human beings have a vital source within them 
which is the origin of rights seems to have no reality for the Professor, 
but it does for Christians who believe from revelation that God creates 
something which makes the human being a person and dignifies him 
with rights. 
Necessary Digression 
A slight digression is necessary to clarify the distinction now being 
made between "person" and "human being." Not so long ago every-
body agreed that any human being was a person. For Christians, the 
theological definition of "human being" applied equally to "person." 
Many Christians still use the terms interchangeably, and are surprised 
February, 1978 57 
to see others making distinctions. Today, "human being" is often used 
as a scientific term to identify something that comes from human 
parents, with the same chromosomal makeup and genetic code, whose 
embryonic development, anatomic structure, and physiological func-
tions are similar to a being classified as homo sapiens. "Person" is 
reserved to identify a human being who has rights. This distinction 
became more widely used sometime after the Supreme Court declared 
that a fetus had no constitutional rights until it was viable. 
Back again to Fletcher's view. It must be admitted that he is no 
different from many other Christians in declaring a time when a 
human being becomes a person. Proponents can be found for almost 
every stage of the development continuum - conceptus, blastocyst, 
embryo, fetus, neonate, infant, child, and teenager. To arrive at a 
"time" theory, Fletcher and these proponents set down a criterion for 
the emergence of personhood from sciences such as embryology, 
psychology, anatomy, sociology, etc. 
The question is asked: Which science offers the most accurate start-
ing point for personhood? No one can answer it, and thus none of the 
theories are any help in giving guidance in a practical situation where 
one has to decide the moral issue: Are any rights being violated in this 
proposed project of fetal research? Since none of the theories is cer-
tain, there is only one way for a Christian to decide - take the safe 
course by acting on the presumption that the conceptus has rights. If 
judgments are made with respect for the presumed personal rights of 
the conceptus, then no rights will be violated. To say, for example, 
that the fetus to be aborted is usable in research because it is not 
wanted and has no rights, is to take a risk that rights will be violated. 
This is Fletcher's stand. In no way can a Christian accept this position. 
Next, Christians gladly accept the DREW regulations and guidelines 
in as much as they are expressions of moral concern which the Ameri-
can people have in response to those pediatricians and embryologists 
who feel that no regulations should impede fetal research. But that 
does not necessarily mean that they accept them as their own personal 
moral views. 
Those pediatricians and embryologists who advocate that no regula-
tions restrict nontherapeutic fetal research claim that "The research is 
necessary to help future generations. We must be allowed to do it, 
unhampered, for the public good." In the light of this "great need" 
for society, the moral issues involved are forgotten. But a Christian 
cannot forget them; human life is present and human rights need to be 
considered. 
The DREW regulations defend human life, but the source of these 
restrictions comes from public policy, which is the raison d 'etre for 
laws and court jUdgments. Public policy, though it might help in guid-
ing a ' Christian's conscience to do the right thing, is not the sole 
source, and sometimes no source at all. Each Christian should make up 
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his conscience according to revealed truths and philosophy. Maybe 
these regulations express moral judgments that Christians accept, but 
there is no built-in guarantee that they will because the source from 
whence they came is not Christian. 
McCormick and Walters arrive at a solution for the use of fetuses in 
clinical research in a typically Christian way, but in doing so they 
seem to ignore certain aspects of Christian revelation. This can be seen 
in two of their principles: 1) "All members of a society owe certain 
minimal debts to that society, among them the duty to take part in 
relatively safe biomedical research projects" - from this they con-
cluded that parents, willing to take the responsibility, can consent to 
have their children-to-be-born be subjects in fetal research as long as 
the risks are minimal or non-discernible; 2) the other principle con-
cerns fetal research which involves abortion cases: "Only procedures 
which would be permitted by future parents should be allowed." 
Impracticality of Principles 
The impracticality of these two principles has been pointed out by 
Ramsey,8 who claimed that in order to apply the first principle, two 
questions have to be answered, but neither one can be: What is an 
acceptable definition of "minimal risks?" and, who is the qualified 
judge to declare that a risk is minimal? 
Their second principle might need some word revision because it 
seems to sanction unjust abortions. Mothers who are about to have 
abortions and are asked to consent to fetal testing are advised to 
follow the example of "future parents" who permit their fetuses to be 
used in clinical research. Now it is possible that "procedures which 
would be permitted by future parents" could be unjust. It is certain 
that McCormick and Walters do not support this possibility. 
But no matter how it is worded, it will not be applicable at certain 
times for mothers about to have an abortion. Think of the research 
projects which are designed only for fetuses about-to-be aborted. Here 
no model exists to give guidance. Some other principle is necessary to 
help these mothers protect their fetuses. 
Granted that the practical problems could be solved, there remain a 
couple of knotty questions for Christians: What is the nature of this 
duty which a fetus has, that is, is it a duty in justice or charity? Where 
in philosophy or theology do McCormick and Walters find this duty 
expressed? 
There is real doubt that McCormick and Walters relied upon any 
personally acceptable philosophy to establish that a fetus has a duty in 
justice to participate in research. Two systems, natural law philosophy 
and Kantian deontology, have presented the most favorable theories 
to establish this kind of duty, yet it does not seem to be found in 
either of them. 
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Natural law philosophy makes man responsible because of the law 
of his very nature, but it does not demand that any duty be discharged 
until it is clearly known. Since the fetus can never know the existence 
of this duty, natural law philosophy positively states that the fetus is 
not bound in justice to discharge it. 
Kantian deontology, which defends duty for its own sake, main-
tains that duty is recognized as duty only by a person who is able to 
perceive moral situations; duty cannot exist in a non-reasoning human 
being. It must be said that fetal obligations never could become a part 
of Kantian philosophy. 
There are other philosophical theories that they could use to 
tiemonstrate fetal duty, but all of them have the fatal flaw that their 
arguments contain non-Christian aspects. For instance, utilitarianism 
which says that man achieves his goal when his actions give the most 
happiness to the most people, does approve of certain types of fetal 
research. The flaw shows in the altruistic goals set up by John Stuart 
Mill and G. E. Moore, two proponents of this philosophy. In this 
system, man's goal for existing is ultimately reduced to a means - he 
serves the common good. This means that fetuses should be used in 
research when they can further the common good. McCormick and 
Walters would reject this philosophy for Christian reasons. Christ 
taught that man's final goal is not in this life. He does not exist for the 
state or for the common good. His goal is self-perfection which is 
achieved in part by charitable actions toward his fellow men and 
comes to fulfillment in the next life. 
Let it be granted that McCormick and Walters did not use philos-
ophy as their source for claiming fetal duty in justice. This can be done 
with some bravado because there are still other avenues to examine. 
Did they find fetal duty "in justice" expressed in revelation? A brief 
answer that might have to face a barrage of objections can be given: 
God's revealed truth does not condemn fetal research, but one looks 
in vain for any direct or indirect statement indicating any type of fetal 
obligation. 
It seems clear that McCormick and Walters could not look upon this 
fetal duty as an obligation in justice. There is no foundation for such a 
judgment. But there are heavy indications that within the Christian 
law of charity they have found it. If this is true, then they would 
claim that a fetus is bound by charity to partake in noteworthy re-
search projects when the data sought can only be supplied by fetal 
testing. 
Duty's Existence Denied 
Upon closer examination it seems that the existence of such a duty 
must be denied even though the fetus undergoes no discernible risk. 
Medical research has not advanced enough for anyone to claim with 
certainty that this or that research project will produce benefits for 
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future generations or to prove that the benefits are truly noteworthy. 
When duties are doubtful, they do not exist. 
It must be concluded that the fetus has no obligation in justice or in 
charity to partake in clinical fetal research. However, it has been sug-
gested that the fetus could be presumed to volunteer. Such a sugges-
tion, if acted upon, would really dehumanize the fetus. The Christian 
volunteer receives nobility and merit because he intends to help his 
fellowmen out of a motive of charity based upon supernatural faith. 
No merit can come to the fetus, and it is robbed of any nobility - its 
participation is without love and faith. 
Finally, Ramsey's conclusion, the fourth and last to be examined, 
comes closest to a true moral decision for a Christian. Bluntly stated, 
he believes no clinical fetal research is justified, because no person can 
rightfully and responsibly give proxy consent. But maybe he goes too 
far in rejecting, for all time, any nontherapeutic fetal research. The 
Christian's view is not that closed. There may be some room, but at 
the present time it is hard to see what sort of project might rightfully 
open the door. 
The Christian describes a "human being" as one created by God 
over whom he has a special providence that will enable him to bring 
God's goodness and love to many in his lifetime and to receive God's 
gifts through others . This creature, made to God's own likeness, is 
destined to become a son of God and inherit heaven. Christians believe 
that there is nothing God wants more highly respected in the universe 
than man. 
For instance, what mother who looks upon her unborn child as the 
supreme creation of God can easily give proxy consent for fetal non-
therapeutic experimentation? Most of them would consider the use of 
their children for the gathering of scientific data repulsive. Benefits for 
future generations are so vague and the possibility that they will come, 
so unsure, that mothers cannot be psychologically persuaded by any 
sense of obligation to give proxy consent, and no one should expect 
this type of mother to give it. 
Also, what Christian bio-researcher believing that his work takes on 
greatness when it is directed to helping God's favorite creatures, will 
find it easy to assure himself that non therapeutic fetal research is 
nobler than the traditional respect paid to fetal life? His instincts warn 
him that such research treads on sacred waters, and the outcome could 
be sacrilegious. 
Again, what Christian member of an ethics board who believes in 
the God-given dignity of human life will look upon any proposal for 
non therapeutic fetal research as totally acceptable? For him, fetal 
research has not developed enough prestige to allow him to decide 
that even the best proposal has more merit than the good achieved by 
maintaining the traditional high respect for human life. 
Notice, in each one of these cases there is a reluctance to approve 
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any nontherapeutic fetal research. However, none of them closes the 
door completely. What is happening is a weighing out of values - the 
good that comes from respecting human life in contrast to the benefits 
to humanity coming from fetal research. It is possible that benefits to 
future generations will become a greater Christian value, but today . 
Christian judgment says, "So far it has not happened." If this is the 
direction Christian morality could eventually take, then Ramsey's 
absolute prohibition of fetal research cannot be called Christian. 
A summary of the points made in this Christian view is: 1) personal 
rights are inviolable - they come from within, as opposed to being 
acquired; 2) the fetus must be presumed to possess personal rights any 
time the question of its use in clinical research is being decided; 
3) Christians may use public policy to make moral jUdgments, but 
never exclusively ; they always tum to reason and revelation to help 
them form their consciences; 4) fetuses do not have a duty in justice 
or charity to partake in clinical research; to presume they can volun-
teer would bE: to acknowledge they can be used as means to an end; 
5) Christians should not close the door on the possibility of fetal 
research. 
This analysis has come to an end, but dialogue about the morality 
of nontherapeutic fetal research has not. The position expressed here 
touches basic Christian thought, but it is not meant to be the final 
word. More study on everybody's part must continue in order to bring 
Christian unity out of revelation. At present, the Christian way to 
benefit future generations will come from intensified therapeutic re-
search, where the living fetus and future fetuses still receive supreme 
consideration among God's creatures. 
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